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Emotional Intentionality 
 
MATTHEW RATCLIFFE 
 
Abstract 
This paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of 
intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid 
of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, 
experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging 
disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the 
nature of this disturbance and its relationship to the localized content of an emotional experience. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is fairly uncontroversial to maintain that some or all emotions either are intentional states or at 
least incorporate intentional states. However, there is disagreement concerning the nature of 
emotional intentionality. One could argue that emotions are composed of other types of 
intentional states, perhaps some combination of beliefs, desires, perceptions, and/or bodily 
feelings (where the latter are construed as intentional states directed at one’s own body). But an 
alternative view, which seems to be gaining in popularity, is that emotions incorporate a sui 
generis form of affective intentionality. I will develop a version of this latter view, with specific 
reference to human emotional experience. 1 
 I will assume, from the outset, that contrasts between the ‘feeling’ aspect of emotion and 
the world-directed intentionality of emotion are misplaced. Many bodily feelings are themselves 
intentional and their objects are not restricted to one’s own bodily states. Several philosophers 
have offered largely complementary formulations of this position.2 In my own work, I have 
                                                          
1
 I am concerned with whether and how emotional intentionality differs from non-emotional forms of intentionality. 
I will not address the further issue of whether types of emotions can be distinguished from one another by appealing 
to one or another variant of emotional intentionality. 
2
 See, for example, M. Stocker and E. Hegeman, Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); 
P. Goldie, ‘Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2002), 235-254; 
S. A. Döring, ‘Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation’, Dialectica 61 (2007), 363-394; J. 
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argued that it is through our feeling bodies that we experience things emotionally, in a manner 
analogous to tactual perception of entities that are external to one’s body and sometimes at a 
distance from it.3 Nevertheless, I have come to suspect that the whole debate over whether 
emotions are feelings, cognitive judgments, a mixture of the two, or intentional states of some 
other type (e.g. perceptions) has been something of a distraction. To characterize emotions 
plausibly in terms of ‘judgment’ requires postulating a form of judgment that could equally be 
termed a ‘feeling’, and vice versa. So there is the risk of descending into a largely terminological 
dispute, one that eclipses other important aspects of emotional experience.4 Whichever term we 
adopt, we are left with something that is, at best, necessary but not sufficient for distinctively 
emotional experience. Every experience of every situation involves evaluations of a kind that 
could be characterized in terms of world-directed feeling, evaluative judgment, or -for those who 
dislike both feelings and judgments- affectively charged perception. For instance, my computer 
keyboard and the pile of notes next to it are currently experienced as significant, as mattering to 
me in a particular way, given my ongoing attempt to write an academic paper. But I am not 
‘emotional’ at the moment, at least not in a way that could be contrasted with an ‘unemotional’ 
frame of mind. So, if the difference between an emotional and an unemotional experience is 
qualitative in nature (and I will argue that it is), rather than merely a matter of degrees, it is 
something that appeals to judgment, feeling, and/or perception fail to pin down.  
I accept that all experiences are plausibly riddled with one or another form of ‘affective 
intentionality’.5 However, I am concerned with something more specific; I want to pinpoint a 
                                                          
Slaby, ‘Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2008), 429-
444; B. W. Helm, ‘Emotions as Evaluative Feelings’, Emotion Review 1 (2009), 248-255; G. Colombetti, The 
Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014); J. A. Deonna and F. 
Teroni, ‘Emotions as Attitudes’, Dialectica 69 (2015), 293-311; R. Furtak, Knowing Emotions: Truthfulness and 
Recognition in Affective Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
3
 See, for example, M. Ratcliffe, ‘The Feeling of Being’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 12: 8-10 (2005), 43-60; 
Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Experiences of Depression: a Study in Phenomenology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
4
 For further discussion of this point, see M. Ratcliffe, ‘Grief and the Unity of Emotion’, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 41 (2017), 154-174. 
5
 Elsewhere, I have considered other types of affective experiences in detail, in particular those that I call ‘existential 
feelings’ (see my ‘The Feeling of Being’; Feelings of Being; Experiences of Depression). But what I have not done 
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type of intentionality that distinguishes emotional episodes of whatever duration from other 
forms of experience (or at least distinguishes many of those experiences we tend to label as 
‘emotions’ from other experiences). What renders emotional episodes distinctive is not just an 
evaluative feeling, perception, judgment, or appraisal, directed at some state of affairs. In what 
follows, I will address two additional aspects of emotional experience: (a) the manner in which 
emotion incorporates a wider network of concerns; (b) the dynamic structure of emotion. My 
central claim is that emotional intentionality has a distinctive ‘two-sided’ structure. To 
experience something emotionally is also to experience a potential or actual disturbance of the 
experiential world within which the object of one’s emotion is encountered. This disturbance is 
not a localized experiential content but something that is more diffuse in nature and harder to pin 
down. It involves habitual ways of experiencing, anticipating, and acting, which are more usually 
taken for granted by our thoughts, experiences, and activities. 
Disturbances of world are essentially dynamic, involving processes of varying duration, 
which are often experienced as processes. Given that the localized object of an emotion 
destabilizes a wider context through which that object is experienced and understood, emotions 
are often riddled with tensions. These can be subtle or more pronounced. In extreme cases, they 
are sometimes expressed in terms of an event not making sense, seeming impossible, or not 
feeling real. I will also show how this dynamic can incorporate a disruption of rational thought. 
When one’s world is disturbed, relationships of implication that are embedded in the world and 
ordinarily presupposed by linguistic thought can break down, in ways that people often struggle 
to express. With this, there is a distinctive form of uncertainty concerning how to proceed.6 
 
2. The Structure of Emotion 
There is general consensus among philosophers that, when we experience something 
emotionally, we detect its value, significance, practical meaning, or importance to us. It is often 
stated or implied that such properties are somehow experienced (which need not entail that the 
                                                          
is address the standard emotion categories that philosophers and others more usually focus on. This paper is my 
preliminary attempt to plug the gap. 
6
 Although my focus throughout is on the nature of human emotional experience, some of the points I make could be 
translated into non-phenomenological talk of salience-detection or affordance and associated goals of the organism. 
In that form, they could also be applied to the emotional lives of non-human organisms. 
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relevant experience is more specifically perceptual in nature). Furthermore, they are experienced 
as integral to the intentional object of emotion: the rampaging bull appears frightening; the film 
appears exciting. This might give the impression that emotional ways of experiencing things are 
phenomenologically localized: a particular object of emotion is imbued with certain evaluative 
properties. I do not dispute that something like this is right. However, it should be added that 
how something is experienced as mattering to me also reflects a wider set of cares and concerns. 
To offer a straightforward example, my being afraid of the rampaging bull is symptomatic of the 
fact that I care about my survival. 
What exactly are these ‘concerns’; how, if at all, do they enter into an emotional 
experience; and how do they relate to a concrete object of emotion? In the philosophical 
literature, there are various attempts to address such questions. One of the most developed 
accounts is that of Bennett Helm.7 He distinguishes between the target of an emotion, the formal 
object, and what he calls the ‘focus’. The target (or concrete object) might be a raging bull 
charging in one’s direction, where the formal object would be threat. But what about the focus? 
Emotions, Helm suggests, consist of ‘intentional feelings of import’.8 By import, he means the 
way in which an object of emotion relates to one’s pre-established values. It is only in the light 
of those values that the object (target) possesses one or another evaluative property. In the case 
of the bull, I value my life, my bodily integrity, and the avoidance of pain. And so it appears 
threatening. The presupposed value is what Helm refers to as the ‘focus’ of the emotion. In his 
words, the focus is ‘a background object having import that is related to the target in such a way 
as to make intelligible the target’s having the evaluative property defined by the formal object’.9 
 Importantly, Helm makes clear that the relationship between emotions and their foci is to 
be construed holistically. A given focus, such as valuing my life, implies a range of emotional 
responses to events, which knit together in rational patterns: if one values p, then one ought to 
fear q, experience relief at r, and so forth. The foci around which emotional responses cluster are 
likewise holistically organized. This ‘rational structure of values’, Helm adds, is ‘constitutive of 
                                                          
7
 See Helm, ‘Emotions as Evaluative Feelings’; ‘Love, Identification, and the Emotions’, American Philosophical 
Quarterly 46 (2009), 39-59. 
8
 ‘Emotions as Evaluative Feelings’, 249. 
9
 ‘Emotions as Evaluative Feelings’, 251. 
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one’s identity’.10 So, to summarize, the focus of an emotion can be conceived of as a web of 
interconnected values, relative to which something takes on a certain kind of significance. To the 
extent that these values hang together, a human life has coherence, consistency, and 
distinctiveness. 
Others have couched compatible points in terms of ‘concern’. For instance, Frijda 
maintains that emotions are responses to events that impact on our concerns, and Roberts takes 
emotions to be ‘concern-based construals’ of objects and situations.11 The focus-target 
relationship is also referred to in various other ways. For instance, Nussbaum emphasizes how 
emotions reveal the manner in which things are ‘salient’ to our ‘well-being’, while Ben-Ze’ev 
observes that registering something as significant involves relating it to ‘a certain background 
framework’.12 Glas conceives of the relationship in terms of ‘self-reference’, thus emphasizing 
the ‘double intentionality’ of emotions - how they are directed at concrete objects and 
simultaneously at the self. Emotions, he says, reflect a concern for the survival and integrity of 
the self. They are self-referential, in ways that we do not always have explicit insight into.13 In 
other words, they do or at least can tell us something about ourselves - what we care about; how 
coherent our concerns are. In what follows, I will address the manner in which this ‘focus’ or 
‘self-referential’ aspect of an emotion features in emotional experience. I will suggest that it is 
experienced neither as an internal state of the subject nor as an evaluative property adhering to 
some entity or situation within the world. Rather, for the most part, it is integral to a wider 
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 ‘Love, Identification, and the Emotions’, 48. For a discussion of holism, see also Helm, Emotional Reason: 
Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Others similarly 
endorse the view that emotional values are holistic. For instance, in The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, revised edition, 1976/1993), Robert Solomon suggests that emotions involve not simply 
evaluative judgments but systems of judgments. Ronald De Sousa likewise endorses ‘axiological holism’ 
(‘Emotional Truth’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (2002), 247-263). 
11
 N. H. Frijda, The Laws of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2007 /2013); R. C. Roberts, ‘What an Emotion is: a 
Sketch’, Philosophical Review 97 (1988), 183-209. 
12
 M. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 19; A. Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000), 19. 
13
 G. Glas, ‘Dimensions of the Self in Emotion and Psychopathology: Consequences for Self-Management in 
Anxiety and Depression’, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (2017), 143-155, 144. 
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experiential world that operates as a backdrop to our various experiences, thoughts, and 
activities.  
However, this alone does not suffice to pin down the distinctive structure of emotional 
intentionality. To do so, we need to introduce a further theme that several philosophers have 
picked up on: the sophisticated, dynamic structure of emotion, something that should not to be 
set apart from rational thought. As Nussbaum suggests, an emotion is an intelligent process, one 
that ‘moves, embraces, refuses’. An emotional ‘upheaval’ is not opposed to reason - it is the 
recognition of something, a way of engaging with and making sense of one’s situation.14 
Consistent with this dynamism, it can be added that certain token emotions and also certain types 
of emotions are not momentary eruptions but temporally extended processes. For instance, grief 
and guilt can both persist indefinitely, and their persistence does not demand the constant 
presence of any particular feeling or other experiential quality. Somehow, they endure from time 
A to time B to time C, even if the experiences occurring at these three times have little or nothing 
in common with one another.15 
 I will now show how we can unite the themes of (a) the focus of emotion, (b) the 
dynamics of emotional experience, and (c) the temporally extended structure of certain emotions, 
in order to formulate an account of what it is that makes emotional intentionality distinctive. 
Emotional intentionality, I will suggest, incorporates a dynamic between the focus and the 
concrete object of emotion, where the object is experienced through an evaluative framework but 
also destabilizes that same framework. To varying degrees and in different ways, emotions 
undermine the context, the world, within which they arise.  
                                                          
14
 Upheavals of Thought, 45. Solomon likewise places an emphasis on the dynamic quality of emotion. An emotion, 
he says, is not simply a judgment or system of judgments; it is a ‘purposive attempt to structure our world’ (The 
Passions, xvii). Later, he writes that emotions are ‘engagements with the world’, which are not evaluative 
presentations of concrete objects but ways of being ‘entangled’ in the world. See, for example, his ‘Emotions, 
Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as Engagements with the World’, in R. C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking about 
Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 76-88. For an emphasis 
on emotions as temporally extended engagements with one’s surroundings, see also J. Slaby and P. Wüschner, 
‘Emotion and Agency’, in S. Roeser and C. Todd, (eds.) Emotion and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 212-228. 
15
 See P. Goldie, The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); 
Ratcliffe, ‘Grief and the Unity of Emotion’. 
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3. The World of Emotion 
Emotional experience of a given object ordinarily involves a sense of its actual or potential 
impact on something one cares about in some way.16 Importantly, an explicit object of emotion 
can undermine the very structure through which one evaluates and engages with it. There is a 
circular process of varying subtlety, complexity, and duration, whereby an object of emotion 
disturbs the context in which it is evaluated, in a manner that feeds into one’s ongoing 
experience of that object. This aspect of emotion has not gone entirely unnoticed. For instance, 
Pugmire remarks on how an emotion can ‘reconstitute its prevailing setting’, while Ben-Ze’ev 
writes, ‘Emotions indicate a transition in which the preceding context has changed, but no new 
context has yet stabilized’. However, to my knowledge, nobody has addressed the relevant 
dynamic in any detail.17  
The backdrop to a localized emotional evaluation is experienced neither as a state of 
oneself nor as a situation within a pre-given world. For the most part, it is etched into the world, 
into a realm within which we already find ourselves when we think that p, evaluate q, believe 
that r, or perceive s. Numerous intersecting patterns of activity and associated relationships of 
practical implication are specified by this world; they are habitually engrained into our 
experienced surroundings like intersecting trails through a forest. To make this clearer, I will 
focus specifically on experiences of grief. I will go on to suggest that a distinctive type of 
interaction between the explicit object of emotion and its wider context, although especially 
salient in the case of grief, also characterizes emotional experiences more generally.  
While working on an earlier paper about grief, I was struck by the following sentence from 
an autobiographical account by Joyce Carol Oates: ‘Strange to consider that there would be a 
                                                          
16
 I use the term ‘object’ to mean the ‘concrete object of an emotional experience’ - what the emotion is about. It 
thus encompasses entities, events, and situations – past, present, anticipated, and imagined. 
17
 D. Pugmire, Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 42; Ben-Ze’ev, 
The Subtlety of Emotions, 33. In The Passions and elsewhere, Solomon also considers the relevant aspect of 
experience. However, he does not draw a clear distinction between the evaluation of something, the background to 
that evaluation, and the way in which the two interact, sometimes referring to all of them as ‘emotions’ and as 
‘judgments’ or ‘systems of judgments’. 
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home, now -without my husband- a home to which to take his belongings’.18 How should we 
interpret this? What is at least clear is that grief can involve a profound, pervasive, and prolonged 
disturbance of one’s life. In her own first-person reflections on grief, Nussbaum describes this as 
follows: 
 
When I receive the knowledge of my mother’s death, the wrenching character of that knowledge 
comes in part from the fact that it violently tears the fabric of hope, planning, and expectation that I 
have built up around her all my life. But when the knowledge of her death has been with me for a 
long time, I reorganize my other beliefs about the present and future to accord with it.19 
 
What does this ‘fabric’ consist of? I do not think it can be principally propositional or linguistic 
in nature. As the quotation from Oates seems to indicate, it is something that is more usually 
presupposed by practically-engaged linguistic thought and associated activities. The emotional 
recognition that a particular person has died occurs against a backdrop of interconnected, 
habitual activities and patterns of thought. These depend for their intelligibility on variably 
integrated cares, commitments, and concerns. For some of us, the majority of these activities and 
underlying concerns relate to a particular person in one or another way: I do these things for her; 
I look forward to coming home where she will greet me; we do this together in order to realize 
something that we care about; we can achieve these things together; I cook dinner for us; dinner 
is something we eat together. The intelligibility of various activities thus depends on one’s 
relationship to that person. Suppose one habitually does p in order to further value q. Where the 
possibility of q depends on a given person, so does the intelligibility of doing p, along with 
associated thoughts about doing p and inclinations to do p.  
Now consider how the word ‘home’ is ordinarily used. Although I doubt that we could 
formulate a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as a person’s 
‘home’, we can at least acknowledge various connotations that are ordinarily associated with use 
of the word, including the likes of familiarity, safety, security, comfort, privacy, and family. 
Equipped with such a list, we can formulate a generic statement along the lines of ‘home 
includes x, y, and z’, where the relevant properties do not relate to anyone in particular. However, 
                                                          
18
 A Widow’s Story (London: Fourth Estate, 2011), 65. 
19
 Upheavals of Thought, 80. 
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when I talk of ‘my home’, x, y, and z have a more specific, concrete form: the security of 
returning to a particular person, and the familiarity of certain routines involving that person. 
Hence, when one says ‘I am going home’, what one means by ‘home’ has a particularity to it, a 
self-referential aspect. 
Granted, this aspect is not always at the forefront when one mentions home. When one 
says, ‘I’ve had enough; I’m going home’, one could equally say, albeit rather inelegantly, ‘I have 
had enough of a given social situation and am retreating to my private residence’. In other 
instances, though, ‘homeliness’ is more central to one’s meaning: ‘I just want to be back home’. 
It is here that tensions arise between the fact of someone’s death and the utterance ‘I am going 
home’. Certain of one’s experiences, thoughts, and activities continue to presuppose a practically 
meaningful world, one that has been sculpted by habitual concerns. One also registers, within 
that world, the death of a particular person. And the significance of what has happened 
undermines the very habitual framework through which it is recognized as significant. The 
utterance ‘I am going home’ retains something of its meaning: I can still retreat to my private 
residence.  However, when other connotations of ‘home’ are more contextually salient, there is 
an experience of conflict, even contradiction: ‘my partner has died and I need to withdraw to the 
safe place that I share with my partner’. So the utterance is not outright false or incoherent. Even 
so, there is a tension. In one sense, it is true; in another, it is self-contradictory. And this tension 
is experienced. Seemingly contradictory but still meaningful sentences can thus be constructed, 
such as ‘I’m going home now, although it’s not a home really – not now’, or even ‘my home is 
not my home anymore’.20  
Meaning-erosion of this kind is not exclusive to explicitly indexical language and can be 
much more widespread. There is a kind of self-referentiality implicit in much of our everyday 
discourse. For instance, it might seem that you and I mean exactly the same thing when we say 
‘Hyde Park is nice’. However, where Hyde Park has a web of idiosyncratic associations for you, 
involving a particular person who has died, you may experience much the same tension: ‘Hyde 
Park is nice? How can this be the same Hyde Park after what has happened?’ Whether and to 
                                                          
20
 I take Ronald De Sousa to be addressing this aspect of emotion, or at least something like it, when he remarks: 
‘That standard truth-bearers are digital representations helps to explain the grain of truth in the often expressed 
anxiety about the distortion of reality introduced by abstractions. Abstraction is, by definition, a process of pruning 
details, of ignoring certain distinctions and aspects of reality’ (‘Emotional Truth’, 262). 
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what extent this form of ‘affective self-reference’ is at play in an utterance can seldom be 
determined by propositional content alone. The experienced tension between an event and a 
habitual framework that conflicts with it is therefore difficult to detect and to convey. 
 This kind of tension is not specific to spoken and written language, or even to linguistic 
thought. In the case of grief, one’s relationship with a particular person is subtly implicated in the 
significant properties that entities in the surrounding environment are experienced as having, in 
associated practically salient possibilities, in familiar configurations of equipment and 
accompanying practices, and in habitual patterns of thought. So the full recognition that this 
person has died is also the recognition that something is lost from the world as a whole, that 
certain things no longer make sense. The emotional evaluation undermines the backdrop against 
which it is arises. It is not that something is instantly lost from one’s world. Rather, because a 
profound change in how one habitually experiences and engages with things cannot occur 
instantly (something I take to be a contingent truth about human psychology), there is a kind of 
incomprehension: I recognize something of the import of what has happened, but how could it be 
so when I still inhabit a world with which it is incompatible? Relevant events can therefore seem 
somehow incomprehensible, unfathomable. And the dawning recognition of something’s full 
import illustrates the incompleteness of an initial, perhaps largely propositional, acceptance. 
 Consider the following passage, from Act Five, Scene 2 of Shakespeare’s Othello: 
 
If she come in, she’ll sure speak to my wife - 
My wife! my wife! what wife? I have no wife. 
O insupportable! O heavy hour! 
Methinks it should be now a huge eclipse 
Of sun and moon, and that the affrighted globe 
Should yawn at alteration. 
 
One of the things that makes this moment so shocking is the dawning recognition by Othello that 
‘I have killed my wife’, his growing sense of the import of his deed. It is not simply that he has 
trouble updating a holistic network of propositional beliefs that include ‘Desdemona is alive’. A 
world that he took for granted was imbued with the potential presence of Desdemona. There is a 
conflict between what he has done and the context of its occurrence. As with ‘I’m going home; I 
have no home’, we have ‘she’ll speak to my wife; I have no wife’. The world endures but cannot 
11 
 
be sustained; entrenched structures that rendered intelligible all activity and practical thought are 
gone. In Othello’s case, perhaps there is also a growing recognition that the emotions motivating 
his deed were somehow shallow by comparison. He did not, in killing Desdemona, recognize the 
full significance of his deeds, what a world without her amounted to, what it meant to murder his 
wife. This is an especially extreme and horrifying example of a distinctively emotional type of 
error. One imagines doing p and considers its various consequences, but continues to obliviously 
presuppose a stable world as a backdrop to the imagined repercussions of p. Without living 
through the relevant emotions at the time, one does not recognize that doing p will impact on the 
integrity of that world. So one does p and, on some occasions at least, faces unanticipated 
turmoil. 
In the case of an especially profound emotional upheaval, of the kind that demands radical 
revision of entrenched practice, one is confronted with the inadequacy of practically-oriented 
thought. Relations of the form ‘if p occurs, then q will be achieved, thus contributing to r’ no 
longer apply. As with ‘home’, p and q often have a self-referential rather than generic character. 
Hence the relations between various concepts and propositions depend on circumstances 
particular to one’s own life. Bereft of those circumstances, one cannot mean quite the same 
things by them anymore, and so they no longer relate to one another in the ways they did. Hence 
relations of dependence and implication that were presupposed by one’s thought and practice no 
longer hold, amounting to a profound and distinctive form of uncertainty. There is no way of 
specifying how to go on, what is to be done. It is analogous to writing ‘1, 2, 3, 4’ and then being 
struck by the revelation that nothing specifies what comes next; the rules don’t apply anymore. 
This is an inevitable consequence of structuring one’s relationship with a changeable world 
through sets of concerns that are both intricate and more stable. The two can come apart, such 
that the latter no longer apply. When this happens, certain patterns of reasoning no longer have a 
foothold. As Maclaren observes, also in relation to profound grief:   
 
In this kind of grief, we can find not reiterations and recapitulations of old, sedimented meanings 
and ways of seeing, but rather a genuine openness and vulnerability. The bereaved is not simply 
asking an isolated question; his very life has become a question.21 
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 K. Maclaren, ‘Emotional Clichés and Authentic Passions: a Phenomenological Revision of a Cognitive Theory of 
Emotion’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2011) 45-65, 60. 
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This is not a matter of ‘irrationality’, construed as something to be contrasted with an 
alternative, rational response to the same situation. Rather, it is an unavoidable feature of 
practical reason. We do not think within the confines of a stable, fully determinate experiential 
world. Something that explicit linguistic thoughts and mundane experiences presuppose is 
forever in flux, usually in subtle ways but sometimes more dramatically. And this is what singles 
out emotional intentionality. While believing that p, perceiving q, remembering r, and various 
other intentional attitudes operate within a pre-made world (or at least many tokens of those 
types of attitudes), emotional intentionality has a two-sided structure, where the world in which 
we encounter the object of emotion is itself in transition, in a manner that is inextricable from 
how that object is experienced. 
Although I have focused principally on grief (which, of course, does not exhaust the 
emotional predicament of Othello), the same general observation applies to other types of 
emotion as well: there is a dynamic between evaluative experiences of concrete objects and the 
contexts that these evaluations both presuppose and reshape. This can be much more subtle and 
fairly mundane. In such cases, the disruption to one’s world is also usually more localized and 
short-lived. There is also a distinction to be drawn between potential and actual disturbances. 
Whereas grief concerns something that has actually happened and cannot be reversed, dreading 
some event involves something that has not yet occurred, which will or might disrupt one’s 
world in a certain way. Nevertheless, potential disruptions are also actual disruptions. Even the 
possibility of an event can throw habitual routines into question: one can no longer take things as 
given in the way one did. For instance, the prospect of having an airport runway build next to 
one’s house is sufficient to erode the sense of being at home, with all of the subtle tensions that 
this involves. Other emotions involve relief from actual or potential disturbances. But, here too, 
tensions are evident between the localized content of the experience and its context: ‘I still can’t 
believe I don’t have to worry about it anymore’; ‘it’s really over – I have to keep saying that to 
myself’; ‘I keep pinching myself to make sure it’s not a dream’.22 Hence, with a few 
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 One might think that the distinction between actual and anticipated disruptions tracks the distinction between 
factive and epistemic emotions, where the former are directed at what is the case and the latter at what is to come. 
For this distinction, see R. Gordon, The Structure of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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qualifications, what I have said accommodates a wide range of emotions, including the more 
‘positive’ ones. 
The full content of an emotional experience therefore eludes us if we inadvertently 
conceive of emotions as localized evaluative attitudes that arise within the context of a stable, 
pre-given experiential world. What makes emotional experience distinctive is its two-sidedness: 
the significance attached to an experienced object destabilizes the context in which it is 
experienced as significant. To this, I add a further proposal: In the majority of cases, it is not the 
emotion itself that disrupts. Rather, an emotional process is the manner in which disruption of 
one’s habitual world is acknowledged and, importantly, negotiated. Emotions maintain, actively 
revise, and repair the world that we find ourselves in when we perceive p, remember q, belief r, 
or desire s. So they are not contrary to reason but integral to a broader ‘rationality’; they manage 
and sustain a structured realm of the kind that reason requires in order to operate. 
 
4. Depth of Emotional Feeling 
I have suggested that emotional experience incorporates a distinctive type of interaction between 
a concrete object of emotion and a backdrop against which it is encountered. I now want to say a 
bit more about the structure of the experience and, in particular, about how far the role of 
emotional feeling extends. Emotions are often conceived of as episodic and brief reactions to 
events. For instance, Klaus Scherer defines an emotion ‘as an episode of interrelated, 
synchronized changes’, which respond to ‘an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to 
major concerns of the organism’. He adds that these changes involve a number of different 
organismic systems and, furthermore, that the burden this places on the organism means that 
emotions can only be sustained for very short periods of time: 
 
Given the importance of the eliciting event, which disrupts the flow of behavior, all or most of the 
subsystems of the organism must contribute to response preparation. The resulting massive 
mobilization of resources must be coordinated, a process which can be described as response 
                                                          
However, the phenomenological differences between the two are not so clear-cut. Emotional responses to events that 
have occurred implicate future possibilities in all sorts of ways, and emotional anticipation also involves a change in 
how one relates to an actual situation. 
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synchronization….their duration must be relatively short in order not to tax the resources of the 
organism and to allow behavioral flexibility.23 
 
I agree that emotions are responses to issues of concern. But it is a mistake, in the human 
case, to conceive of the majority as brief, episodic responses. Unlike a dog or a cat, the ways in 
which worldly events matter to us reflect complicated networks of long-term cares, 
commitments, and projects, which intersect with one another to varying degrees. Given the 
complexity of this structure, combined with how our concerns stretch out into an indefinite 
future, shaping our activities for years to come, certain happenings cannot be navigated swiftly. 
They imply profound disruptions, of a kind that can only be fully acknowledged and negotiated 
over a prolonged period. Hence, if we are concerned specifically with human emotions, it is a 
mistake to emphasize short-term responses. The structure of human emotion reflects the structure 
of the human world. In many cases, such as that of grief, human emotions are better thought of 
as prolonged processes.24 The integrity of these processes does not depend on the endurance of a 
specific feeling or ‘quale’. The disturbance itself is unitary in nature, impacting on various 
different aspects of one’s world in virtue of relationships of dependence and implication. 
Consequently, we can construe the emotional negotiation of this disturbance as a unitary process. 
So an emotion such as grief, guilt, or joy can be temporally extended, even though the 
experiences that are constitutive of it may vary considerably from one moment to the next. Those 
experiences remain part of a dynamic whole, with a distinctive two-sided structure. 
 How much of this can be attributed more specifically to emotional feeling? Suppose we 
accept that the initial evaluation of an event involves an evaluative feeling towards it. Surely, one 
might think, this same feeling cannot also include a sense of its own inadequacy, a recognition 
that the evaluation in question does not yet register the full impact of the event on one’s life. My 
response, in short, is that it can - a feeling can point beyond itself, embodying the recognition 
that ‘there is more to come’. To better understand this, it is helpful to consider the notion of 
emotional ‘depth’. Some emotions are said to be deeper than other. Furthermore, these emotions 
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 ‘What are Emotions? And How Can They Be Measured?’, Social Science Information 44 (2005) 695-729, 697, 
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 See Goldie, The Mess Inside. 
15 
 
are sometimes experienced as deep or profound. This, I suggest, is closely tied to the recognition 
that something has to sink in, that it will take time, that there is a greater upheaval to come.  
Consider a conception of depth developed by David Pugmire.25 Consistent with what I 
have said so far, Pugmire associates the depth or profundity of an emotion with the extent to 
which its object impacts on one’s concerns. Those concerns are structured; some are more 
fundamental than others and there are multi-layered relationships of dependence. So a life 
ordinarily has an ‘architecture’, a structure that can be impacted upon by events to varying 
degrees and in different ways.26 Emotional depth is symptomatic of how integrated a person’s 
concerns are, coupled with the extent to which an experienced event impacts on those concerns. 
It can thus be distinguished from intensity. The experience associated with riding a roller coaster 
might be intense but it does not usually imply a change in the structure of one’s life, unlike -say- 
the receipt of tragic news. Pugmire adds that one must also judge that the relevant scenario really 
is the case and also that, for an emotion to be genuinely deep rather than just taken to be deep, 
the experienced significance of events must match their actual significance.27 Hence the actual 
depth of an emotion is determined in part by factors external to the relevant experience.28  
For current purposes, I want to focus on experienced depth or, more specifically, the 
experience of depth, regardless of its veridicality. This, I suggest, can be construed as a 
dimension of emotional feeling; it need not involve a complex of judgments that trace out the 
implications of an event for a life. The emotional feeling only has to point to something; it does 
not need to embody a comprehensive grasp of it. What it points to are patterns of unraveling and, 
in some cases, their potential avoidance. My proposal is that certain emotional feelings embody a 
non-propositional form of anticipation, a variably determinate sense of how something will or 
might impact on one’s life. In addressing this aspect of experience, I find it helpful to draw on 
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 Sound Sentiments, 40. 
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themes in the later work of Edmund Husserl, who addresses how experience has a non-
propositional anticipatory structure, incorporating relationships of implication that differ in kind 
from propositional implication.29 Affectivity, for Husserl, has its own distinctive kind of 
‘lawfulness’, involving patterns of unfolding anticipation and their experienced negation or 
fulfilment.30 Something like this applies here. Granted, whether and how a certain event will 
impact upon one’s world is not always recognized or felt immediately. Sometimes, even the 
initial recognition takes time. Nevertheless, on many occasions, there is an immediate 
recognition that something will have profound repercussions; that the habitual patterns of one’s 
world will unravel; that the process has begun. So the feeling points not only to an object of 
emotion but also towards the world in which it is encountered. What I currently feel is not fully 
captured by the content of a given moment. A feeling of depth is the signaling of a route; it is 
more like a sign towards something than a map of it.31 And that sign can be more or less 
accurate. There is an analogy here with tip-of-the-tongue experiences; the feeling points to 
something - it is coming, and the determinate content that then appears conforms to what was 
anticipated. Nevertheless, that content was not already contained in the anticipatory feeling.  
I concede that explicit conceptual appraisals and reappraisals play a role too, but they are 
not essential to a feeling of depth, to the sense that one’s current experience of an event or 
situation impacts upon its context, in ways that may signal the onset of a prolonged emotional 
process. With this, one’s current emotional experience can incorporate a sense of its being 
inadequate to the moment, something that will be transformed, surpassed. Consequently, it is 
possible to experience the procession of feelings as a singular process, an unfolding pattern of 
anticipation and realization. If emotional feeling is instead conceived of solely as a way in which 
a determinate object is experienced, then the account remains importantly incomplete. What we 
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are left with is an abstraction from a much larger experience, where the whole can just as 
plausibly be described as ‘felt’. The emotional feeling is itself two-sided.32 
 
5. The Distinctiveness of Emotional Intentionality 
I have argued that, if the term ‘emotion’ is associated simply with some conception of how we 
detect salience or experience value, the resulting account is too permissive to pinpoint the 
distinctive intentionality of occurrent emotion. This applies regardless of whether we appeal to 
appraisals, judgments, feelings, perceptions, or any other type of intentional state with a 
circumscribed content. Emotions also involve actual or potential revision of the world within 
which we feel, believe, perceive, and judge, and within which various propositions and their 
interrelations are intelligible against a backdrop of habitual cares and concerns.  
 The account I have sketched here is to be reserved for emotional ‘ruptures’, involving 
actual or anticipated scenarios. This is largely consistent with everyday usage of the term 
‘emotion’. It also serves to identify a distinctive category of experience, one that plays a 
particular role in our lives. In addition, it implies that intentionality is not a singular kind of 
relation, even if we restrict ourselves to a phenomenological conception of it. Some kinds of 
intentional experience arise within a world, whereas others call that world into question. 
 Does this amount to a unitary account of emotion? There is no prospect of its mapping 
onto a single, currently agreed inventory of ‘emotions’, given that no such inventory exists. One 
could simply stipulate that the relevant dynamic is the hallmark of emotional intentionality and 
proceed to exclude any phenomena that do not incorporate it from the category ‘emotion’, at 
least for certain theoretical purposes. However, the merits of such revisionary exercises are 
questionable. Less contentiously, I suggest that the account at least captures a ‘core’ group of 
emotional phenomena, certain paradigm cases of ‘strong emotion’. Furthermore, it can also be 
applied more widely. Where less pronounced emotions are concerned, the dynamic is present but 
less conspicuous, more localized, and usually more transient too. So, by focusing on ‘deeper’ 
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emotions where it is more conspicuous and therefore easier to spot, we can draw attention to a 
wider-ranging phenomenon. It can be added that various emotions that do not seem to fit the bill 
tend to be associated with labels such as ‘shallow’, ‘self-alienating’, ‘inauthentic’, ‘not genuine’, 
or are construed as deficient in some other respect (e.g. Maclaren, 2011; Milligan, 2008; Szanto, 
2017).33 Hence they could be construed in normative terms, as a deviation from something else - 
somehow derivative of it.34  
Even so, there are exceptions. It is not at all clear that enduring love or hate have the kind 
of structure I have described. Neither does ongoing enjoyment of an inconsequential pastime. 
And there many other affective experiences that should be kept distinct. For instance, there are 
what I call ‘existential feelings’, which are constitutive of an ability to find things significant in 
one or another way and thus amount to a differential susceptibility to the various types of 
emotional disruption (Ratcliffe, 2005; 2008; 2015). We might also wonder about the kinds of 
phenomena labeled as moods, habits, temperaments, character traits, background feelings, 
feelings of vitality, and so forth. However, the point I have tried to make is not so much about 
how we should categorize things for whatever purpose. Rather, I have sought to make explicit a 
seldom-acknowledged type of intentionality that is sometimes at work in affective experience, a 
two-sided, dynamic experience that can be fraught with tensions. This, I suggest, is what 
distinguishes at least some ‘emotions’ from other forms of intentional experience. 
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